Hey, saw your PR #43 - the QEMU build matrix is a solid start. Left a comment there about two things: the /output mount path issue in the CI workflow, and the awg-tools version question (the PPA arm64 build might still be 1.x). Are you working on those, or would it help if I tested on my end?
No dedicated Mastodon account yet. For updates, GitHub Releases works as an RSS/Atom feed: https://github.com/bivlked/amneziawg-installer/releases.atom - subscribe in any feed reader. Considering fosstodon.org as a future home if there’s enough interest.
Fair question. When the H1-H4 thing happened, my first thought was “why didn’t the tests catch this?” - because there wasn’t a test for it. Now there is.
I use bats - 85 tests in 10 files. The H1-H4 fix got its own test_h_ranges.bats with 10 cases, including an INT32_MAX boundary check that runs 20 iterations. All scripts also pass shellcheck with zero warnings.
Every release gets tested on a fresh VPS - Ubuntu 24.04 and Debian 13, full install through both reboots, then every manage command. For bigger changes I get a second pair of eyes on the code - that’s how we caught a restore function not enforcing 600 perms on key files before it shipped.
No CI yet though - tests run locally and on the VPS, not on every push. GitHub Actions is next. The ARM PR (#43) is already adding CI for the ARM builds, so it’s a good time to wire up x86_64 too.
Author here. Didn’t expect this post to blow up like this — thanks for all the questions.
A bug came up right after I posted, and I just pushed out v5.8.0 for it. A user couldn’t get the tunnel up on a mobile connection in Russia, and I traced it back to the H1-H4 hash ranges: turns out I was hardcoding the same four ranges into every install, so every server running this script had an identical static fingerprint. The TSPU apparently learned those defaults - my bad.
The fix: H1-H4 now get randomized per install from /dev/urandom - different values every time, no shared defaults. Each server speaks its own dialect.
On the detection-vs-blocking point (possiblylinux127, WhyJiffie): you’re right that shape-shifting headers don’t make traffic invisible, just unmatchable to a simple rule. litchralee nailed it further up - statistical analysis over time could still fingerprint this, but that’s a per-target attack, not something a national DPI box runs on everyone. For the ISP-level blocking that’s actually happening in Russia and Iran right now, per-install randomization is what matters.
Referenced your comment in my top-level reply - you got the mechanism right. One thing worth adding on the statistical angle: building a baseline requires known AWG traffic to train on first. CPS (I1-I5) randomizes packet timing and cadence on top of headers, which makes even gathering that training data harder. Per-target surveillance is real but it’s a different threat model from what the tool addresses.